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A B S T R A C T
Technology transfer is essential for transitioning to a low carbon economy which can include hydropower.
Chinese dam developers allegedly dominate the global hydropower industry. Studies have been carried out on
technology transfer in their undertakings in Africa and Asia. However, such work is lacking for Europe and Latin
America. The aim of this paper is to identify the extent, drivers and inhibitors of technology transfer of Chinese
dam developers’ undertakings in Europe and Latin America. We ﬁnd relatively few Chinese undertakings and
thus limited evidence for technology transfer both in Europe and Latin America. Transfers identiﬁed are fre-
quently mutual with the Chinese player transferring technology to the host country and vice versa. This transfer
is driven by business considerations in Europe (costs, capacities) and Latin America (costs, lacking access to
ﬁnance), but also geopolitical ones (Europe: creation of a trading area; Latin America: access to (natural) re-
sources). It is impeded by Chinese dam developers’ poor reputation regarding safeguards as well as (only in Latin
America) protectionist policies and signiﬁcant capacities of host country players. Our research provides trans-
parency regarding the European and Latin American hydropower industry, while also highlighting that attempts
to inﬂuence what kind of technology is transferred by Chinese dam developers may be worthwhile.
1. Introduction
The transition towards a low carbon economy is seen as a major
challenge by policy-makers around the world (Bridge et al., 2013;
Geels, 2012). Hydropower dams are considered by many as a part of the
energy mix of a low carbon economy, particularly for developing
countries which have not exploited many economically viable hydro-
power sites yet (Gernaat et al., 2017; Zarﬂ et al., 2015). Hydropower
already provides 16% of the global electricity and about 85% of global
renewable electricity (IEA, 2016). Its role as a renewable electricity
source is projected to grow in the coming years due to an un-
precedented boom in dam construction currently under way with in-
stalled global hydropower capacity expected to increase by 73% until
2040 (Zarﬂ et al., 2015). Despite this boom, hydropower remains ex-
tremely contested due to its vast negative environmental and social
impacts (Khagram, 2004; Kirchherr et al., 2016a; McCully, 2001; WCD,
2000). Some have even questioned if hydropower is an appropriate
technology to use because of these impacts (Ansar et al., 2014;
Kirchherr, 2017a; Warner et al., 2017).
Mitigating hydropower dams’ negative environmental and social
impacts is a challenge, as is their construction from an engineering
standpoint, particularly for many energy-hungry developing countries
(Biswas, 2012; Hensengerth, 2015a). Traditionally, the World Bank as
the largest international donor linked to hydropower facilitated tech-
nology transfer (term deﬁned in Section 3) to enable developing
countries to exploit their hydropower resources (Kirchherr et al., 2017;
Park, 2010). However, a funding gap opened when World Bank decided
to opt out of hydropower dam ﬁnancing in the early 2000s due to the
massive public protests.1 This funding gap helped to prepare the ground
for the rise of Chinese players in the global hydropower industry
(Biswas, 2012; International Rivers, 2012; Kirchherr, 2017b; McDonald
et al., 2009). It coincided with the Chinese government's 2001 Going
Out Strategy which encouraged SOEs to expand abroad to continue
their growth and increase Chinese inﬂuence (Chen et al., 2017; Motta
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and Matthews, 2017).
Chinese hydropower dam developers2 are said to dominate the
global dam industry nowadays (Urban et al., 2015a, p. 577 ﬀ.;
Verhoeven, 2015, p. 178 ﬀ.). Yet a comprehensive and up-to-date
public database on dam projects with Chinese involvement around the
world is not available (Kirchherr, 2017b). Most scholars, e. g. Urban
et al. (2013) and Kirchherr et al. (2017b), seeking data on such in-
volvement rely on the database developed by International Rivers, an
NGO mostly advocating against large dams (Eichert, 2014), which was
last updated in November 2014 (International Rivers, 2014). However,
the industry is dynamic and much has changed since 2014 (Tan-Mullins
et al., 2017).
Sinohydro is believed to be the largest dam developer in the world
allegedly constructing every second dam globally (Mang, 2012, p. 2;
Verhoeven, 2015, p. 124). The second major Chinese dam developer is
China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC) which built the infamous
China Three Gorges Dam (Wilmsen and Webber, 2016; Xu et al., 2011).
Other major Chinese dam developers are China International Water and
Electric Corporation (CWE) and China Gezhouba Group (International
Rivers, 2015; Mang, 2012; Urban et al., 2015b). All of these companies
are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (McDonald et al., 2009).
Numerous scholars have studied Chinese dam developers’ engage-
ment overseas in recent years. Two observations stand out when ex-
amining this body of literature. First, only a single study, Urban et al.
(2015b), considers Chinese dam developer’ involvement from the per-
spective of technology transfer despite hydropower dams’ alleged role
as a (challenging to develop) source of renewable electricity for de-
veloping countries aiming to transition to a low carbon economy.
Second, current studies focus on dam projects with Chinese involve-
ment in Asia (e. g. Matthews and Motta, 2015, Hensengerth (2015a,
2015b), Chan, 2017, Lamb and Dao, 2017) and Africa (e. g.
Hensengerth, 2012, Kirchherr et al., 2016b, Yankson et al., 2017) or
both Asia and Africa (e. g. Tan-Mullins et al., 2017, Siciliano and Urban,
2017, Urban et al., 2015a), while neglecting other parts of the world.3
The regional focus of this study is Europe and Latin America (we
consider those countries to be part of Europe respectively Latin America
that have been outlined as such by WHO (2017a, 2017b). Europe and
Latin American may be regions of speciﬁc interest for at least two
reasons. First, both regions are viewed as regions declining in power
(Edwards, 2009; Webber and Douglas, 2016) with rising powers such as
China possibly exploiting this decline (Christensen, 2015). Second,
Europe and Latin America appear as notable markets for Chinese hy-
dropower players with every tenth dam with Chinese involvement
being constructed in Europe and Latin America, according to
International Rivers (2014).
This paper aims to advance the literature on Chinese dam devel-
opers by providing a helicopter view on technology transfer in Chinese
dam developers’ undertakings in Europe and Latin America.4 This is the
ﬁrst study that speciﬁcally examines Chinese undertakings in Europe
and Latin America and thus also technology transfer in Chinese dam
developers’ undertakings in these parts of the world, as far as we are
aware. We examine the extent, drivers and inhibitors of technology
transfer in Chinese dam developers’ undertakings in Europe and Latin
America. To do so, we have carried out more than 40 semi-structured
interviews with relevant industry players in 2015, 2016 and 2017 in-
cluding interviews with several Chinese dam developers such as CTGC
and CWE. These interviews are complemented by document analysis.
Overall, we ﬁnd relatively few undertakings of Chinese dam developers
both in Europe and Latin American and thus limited evidence for
technology transfer. The technology transfer identiﬁed is frequently
mutual with the Chinese dam developer transferring technology to the
host country and vice versa. It is driven both by business and geopoli-
tical considerations. Meanwhile, it is inhibited by Chinese dam devel-
opers’ dismal reputation regarding safeguards and (only in Latin
American) protectionist policies and signiﬁcant capacities of host
country players.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides background regarding the hydropower industry in Europe and
Latin America. Section 3 outlines technology transfer as the theoretical
framing for this study. Section 4 presents our methods. Meanwhile,
Section 5 analyzes the technology transfer and its drivers and inhibitors
for Chinese dam developers’ undertakings in Europe and Latin America.
We summarize our argument and outline policy implications of this
work in Section 6.
2. Background
While Europe as a global power may be declining, electric power
consumption per capita in Europe remains among the greatest in the
world (World Bank, 2017a). Hydropower provides around one-third of
this electricity (World Bank, 2015). Countries such as Norway gain
more than 95% of their electricity from hydropower (World Bank,
2015). Yet hydropower development in Europe is stagnating since the
most lucrative sites have already been developed in the ﬁrst half of the
20th century (Biswas, 2012). The exception are selected countries in
Eastern Europe which can still hold large unexploited and economically
viable hydropower potential (IHA, 2017; World Energy Council,
2016a). Interviewees noted that the general stagnation of hydropower
development in Europe has led to a decay of hydropower capacities
among many European players (further information on interviewees in
Section 4). “The Chinese outcompete us on [technical] capacities to
construct large dams”, a European dam developer said. This resonates
with Kirchherr et al. (2016b) who writes that Chinese developers would
be known for delivering “large dam projects with relatively few over-
runs in either the schedule or budget”.
Interviewees shared the impression that Chinese dam developers are
extremely active in Europe and even felt threatened by them at times.
For instance, a policy-maker at the European Investment Bank (EIB)
complained that “the Chinese are trying to steal our projects”, whereas
he acknowledged that EIB does not systematically scan Chinese dam
developers’ undertakings in Europe. However, the extent of Chinese
undertakings in Europe is limited, according to our study. A total of 15
Chinese undertakings were identiﬁed via our work (Table 4). This ac-
counts for a maximum of one-tenth of total undertakings in Europe,
according to estimates from our interviews. The identiﬁed undertakings
are concentrated in Eastern Europe. Most (three) are in Russia, followed
by Macedonia and Georgie (two each). Of the identiﬁed undertakings,
ﬁve are proposed, one under-construction, seven are completed and one
is suspended.5
While electricity consumption in Europe is signiﬁcant, the opposite
is true in Latin America. Only Africa consumes less electricity per capita
than Latin America. Much of Latin America's energy stems from hy-
dropower, with the region accounting for over 20% of global hydro-
power production (IHA, 2017; Rubio and Tafunell, 2014). Excluding
China, Latin America has experienced the fastest hydropower growth in
2 We usually abbreviate ‘Chinese hydropower dam developers’ with ‘Chinese devel-
opers’ throughout this study to enhance readability. We note that a ‘Chinese hydropower
dam developer’ can also be a ﬁrm that merely provides elements of the hydropower dam,
e. g. turbines.
3 Two exceptions regarding the second observation are acknowledged. First, McDonald
et al. (2009) provide a global overview regarding Chinese dam developers’ undertakings.
Second, Nordensvard et al. (2015) examine Sinohydro's policy documents. Yet both of
these studies lack speciﬁc discussions regarding relevant undertakings in selected regions
such as Europe and Latin America. We further note that information regarding technology
transfer in undertakings involving Chinese dam developers can be retrieved from studies
mentioned in this paragraph beyond Urban et al. (2015b), whereas technology transfer is
not the theoretical framing of these studies.
4 We do not examine European and Latin American dam developers’ undertakings in
China via this work. 5 We could not determine the status of one undertaking.
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the world over the last 30 years (IHA, 2017; Rubio and Tafunell, 2014).
The rapid rise of hydropower across the region was primarily an out-
come of the oil crisis of the 1970s, as the region was largely dependent
on oil for energy production and rapidly had to diversify its energy mix.
Hydropower development further accelerated from the 1980s onwards
as technology and expertise in the region became more cost-eﬀective
and enhanced (Rubio and Tafunell, 2014). Latin American hydropower
dam developers are infamous for their ability to develop extremely
complex mega projects since the completion of the Itaipu HPP in 1984
(built by Unicon, a Brazilian player, and Conempa, a Paraguayan player
(Itaipu Binacional, 2017)); the Itaipu HPP is the largest operational
hydroelectric energy producer in the world until today (PT, 2017a).
Our interviews revealed that a common perception among observers
of the Latin American dam industry is that, like Europe, Chinese dam
developers are extremely active on this continent. However, when ex-
amining the data in more detail we found that “there is much less
[going on] than perceived”, as a consultant of a Chinese dam developer
also claimed. Overall, 29 undertakings and thus almost twice as many
as in Europe were identiﬁed (Table 5). No estimate was attainable as to
how this number compares to the total number of relevant undertakings
in Latin America; accessing data on Latin American endeavours was
more diﬃcult for us than for the European case. We suspect that the
undertakings with Chinese involvement in Latin America also account
for no more than one-tenth of all relevant undertakings in this region.
Chinese dam developers’ engagement in Latin America would then need
to be considered as limited. Most undertakings (ten) are in Ecuador,
followed by Honduras (four). Of these undertakings, eight are pro-
posed, eleven are under-construction, nine are complete and one is
suspended.
3. Theoretical framing
Lacking access to technology is seen as a major bottleneck for de-
veloping countries aiming to transition towards a low carbon economy
(Li, 2016; van der Gaast et al., 2009). Technology transfer emerged as a
possible response to this bottleneck in the early 1990s (Bell, 1990;
Schnepp et al., 1990); it is considered as “a cornerstone” (Lema and
Lema, 2012, p. 24) of the transition towards a low carbon economy
since the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) featured
it prominently in its 2000 report (IPCC, 2000). Technology transfer is
deﬁned as the movement of technology from the site of origin (in our
case: China) to the site of use (in our case: Europe respectively Latin
America) (Ahmed, 2009, p. 3). This deﬁnition implies that even if a
technology is already in use in a recipient country, further transfer of
this technology to this country can still occur. While the technology
transfer concept has been hyped, a lack of progress is to be reported in
achieving technology transfer in practice. This may have induced a
broader conceptualization of the term in recent years (Ockwell et al.,
2010; Pueyo et al., 2011).
We consider dimensions, channels and types of technology transfer
throughout this study. Hardware and software are the main dimensions
of technology transfer, a conceptualization introduced by Bell (1990)
and further reﬁned by Bell (2009) and Ockwell et al. (2010). Early
literature on the topic mostly conceptualized technology transfer as
hardware transfer (Lema et al., 2015; Pueyo et al., 2011). Hardware
refers to all technology needed to create the physical facilities (in our
case: a hydropower dam) envisaged by the technology transfer re-
cipient. It thus comprises capital goods and equipment (e. g. turbines)
as well as services such as engineering services to produce the dam
design or consultancy services to develop an environmental and social
impact assessment (ESIA). Any dam project built outside of China by a
Chinese dam developer is thus an instance of hardware transfer. This
even includes a hydropower dam built by a Chinese player without any
participation of the host country which is then handed over to operators
from the host country once completed.
Meanwhile, software refers to skills needed upon the completion of
the physical facilities at question. Software transfer is now considered
as essential for successful technology transfer. A successful technology
transfer is one that does not only provide hardware, but that also en-
ables the recipient country to operate/maintain, replicate and innovate
the received hardware (Ockwell and Mallett, 2012; Pueyo et al., 2011).
Software can be diﬀerentiated in know-how and know-why skills.
Know-how skills are the skills enabling the operation and maintenance
of the physical facilities at question. For instance, these can include
know-how regarding sedimentation management for a hydropower
dam (Dai and Liu, 2013; McCully, 2001). A minimum level of expertise
is usually needed for the recipient country to be able to (learn to) op-
erate a technology (Hensengerth, 2015b; Omar et al., 2011).6
Know-why skills refer to the ability to understand the principles of
how the physical facilities at question work. These know-why skills are
thus essential for the replication of the work via another project and for
further innovation of facilities (Bell, 2009; Lema and Lema, 2012). Let
us assume that a project was completed by a Chinese developer with
this developer using a novel technique for underground works during
the project.7 If this novel technique was not explained to those in the
recipient country throughout or upon completion of the project, no
know-why skills have been transferred. The country would thus not be
better oﬀ in carrying out a speciﬁc task (in this case: constructing a
dam) despite this task having been carried out within the country's
borders. The transfer of know-why skills may be facilitated if a local
partner participates in a project (Urban et al., 2015b). Since we found
no evidence of know-why transfer in this study, we do not list it in the
key tables of this paper, Tables 3–5.
While international donors such as the World Bank played a major
role in enabling technology transfer initially, as indicated in the in-
troduction, the main source for technology transfer these days is the
private sector (e. g. argued by IPCC, 2000, Kulkarni, 2003 and
Schneider et al., 2008). The channels of private sector technology
transfer considered in this study are trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) (Niederberger and Saner, 2005; Schneider et al., 2008) with the
former being the far more common one (Schneider et al., 2008, p. 2931
ﬀ.).8 The combination of trade and FDI are called ‘undertakings’
throughout this paper. Technology transfer via trade occurs through
provision of hardware and/or software (e. g. for the construction of a
hydropower dam) to the recipient country. Meanwhile, technology
transfer via FDI occurs through investments made by foreign entities (e.
g. a Chinese dam developer) in local entities (e. g. a European dam
developer or a speciﬁc Latin American dam project), which enables the
investor to exchange hardware and software with the (partly) pur-
chased entity.
We ﬁnd and thus distinguish two types of technology transfer in this
study (Lema et al., 2015; Winstead, 2014; World Bank, 2017b). North-
South technology transfer (NSTT) and South-South technology transfer
(SSTT). NSTT is technology transfer from developed to developing
countries; it is the type of technology transfer considered most fre-
quently in the scholarly literature (Lema and Lema, 2012; Urban et al.,
2015b, 2015c). SSTT is technology transfer from developing to devel-
oping countries. The latter type of technology transfer has only been
considered very recently by scholars (Norasingh et al., 2015; Urban
6 Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts oﬀer some solution for countries lacking this
minimum level of expertise. Projects under BOT contracts are not only designed, ﬁnanced
and constructed by a dam developer, but then also operated by this developer
(International Rivers, 2012). An example of this is Cambodia's Kamchay Dam which will
be operated by Sinohydro for 44 years. This allows Cambodia to beneﬁt from this tech-
nology, although it may be unable to operate it (Hensengerth, 2015a; Siciliano et al.,
2016).
7 This example was provided by a reviewer of this paper.
8 Schneider et al. (2008) also lists a third channel of technology transfer which is li-
censing, deﬁned as the “purchase of production and distribution rights and the underlying
technical information and know-how to exploit them” (Schneider et al., 2008, p. 2931).
However, licensing is not practiced in the hydropower industry, as far as we are aware,
and thus not considered in this study.
J. Kirchherr, N. Matthews Energy Policy 113 (2018) 546–558
548
et al., 2015c). Admittedly, developing countries consist “of a diverse set
of countries from emerging economies to low-income countries” (Lema
et al., 2015, p. 184). We deﬁne those countries as developing countries
that are denoted by the World Bank as low income (LI), lower middle
income (LMI) or upper middle income (UMI) (with the latter category
comprising countries such as Belarus and China), while developed
countries are those denoted as high income (HI) (Lema et al., 2015;
Winstead, 2014; World Bank, 2017b).
We acknowledge that some readers may disagree with the cate-
gorization of China as a player of the South, given China's already
discussed (alleged) dominance in the global hydropower industry as
well as its rise as a global power (Pan and Tin-Yau Lo, 2017; Zhang,
2016). The conceptualization of China as a player of the South is
common in the relevant scholarly literature, though (Urban et al.,
2015b, 2015c) and also consistent with our operationalization in the
previous paragraph. We have therefore retained this conceptualization,
while acknowledging that China may need to be re-categorized soon.
Drivers of technology transfer have been frequently discussed in the
scholarly literature. We distinguish between business and geopolitical
drivers throughout this study, a distinction inspired by Kirchherr
(2017b). The business driver regarding technology transfer is the need
of a stakeholder in the recipient country for a technology that either
cannot be provided or cannot be provided cost-competitively domes-
tically. The larger and thus more complex an envisaged project is (with
thus only few companies having the relevant hardware and software),
the more likely it is that technology transfer will occur and novel
technology may be introduced to a country via this technology transfer
(Gandenberger et al., 2016; Weitzel et al., 2015). Countries with com-
paratively low levels of development can be particularly susceptive for
the transfer of capital goods, with other hardware such as equipment or
engineering services being available domestically in principle once
capital goods are secured (Gandenberger et al., 2016; World Bank,
2017b).
The scholarly literature further highlights that technology transfer
can be facilitated, e. g. via preferential loans, if the provider maintains
an interest to secure access to the market of the (potential) recipient
and/or natural resources in the country at question (Foster et al., 2008;
Prato and Nepelski, 2013). We call this latter driver a geopolitical
driver. This driver can be of particular relevance if companies involved
are SOEs (as is the case with Chinese dam developers, as outlined
previously) which thus may particularly entangle business and geopo-
litical considerations. Our methods to gather empirical ﬁndings for the
theoretical framing introduced in this section are discussed next.
4. Methods
The chosen unit of analysis for this study and thus our case studies
for this work are Chinese hydropower dam developers. This implies the
exclusion of other players, e. g. those only constructing irrigation dams.
We particularly focus on Sinohydro and CTGC, the largest Chinese dam
developers, as outlined in Section 1, while also considering additional
Chinese dam developers if relevant undertakings by these players are
identiﬁed in Europe and/or Latin America. The diﬀerent dam devel-
opers analyzed in this study are depicted in Table 1. We note these
developers usually construct large dams with all HPPs considered in
this study being large dams.9 We further note that some of the Chinese
Table 1
Case studies.
Main case studies Sinohydro
China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC)
Additional case studies China Gezhouba
China Harbin Electric International
China Huadian Engineering
China International Water and Electric Corporation
(CWE)
China National Electric Equipment Corporation
(CNEEP)
Dongfang Electric Corporation
Guizhou Wujiang Hydropower Development
Huaneng Langcang River Hydropower
Hydro China
Hydrolancang International Energy Norinco
International
State Grid
Yangtze Power
Table 2
Interviewee overview.
# Interviewee Organization Type of
Organization
1 Professor Tsinghua University Academia
2 Professor Chinese university Academia
3 Researcher Chinese university Academia
4 Staﬀ International Finance
Corporation (IFC)
International
donor
5 Staﬀ European Investment Bank
(EIB)
International
donor
6 Staﬀ European Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD)
International
donor
7 Staﬀ Inter-American Development
Bank
International
donor
8 Staﬀ European development aid
agency
International
donor
9 Staﬀ Large international NGO NGO
10 Staﬀ Large international NGO NGO
11 Staﬀ Nature Conservancy NGO
12 Staﬀ Regional NGO (Latin America) NGO
13 Staﬀ Large international NGO NGO
14 Staﬀ International Rivers NGO
15 Managing director Think tank NGO
16 Staﬀ International NGO NGO
17 Staﬀ (Latin America) Large international NGO NGO
18 Staﬀ (Latin America) Large international NGO NGO
19 Staﬀ World Wildlife Fund (WWF) NGO
20 Staﬀ International NGO NGO
21 Staﬀ China International Water &
Electric Corporation (CWE)
Private sector
22 Staﬀ China Three Gorges
Corporation (CTGC)
Private sector
23 Staﬀ Chinese dam developer Private sector
24 Staﬀ Chinese dam developer Private sector
25 Senior staﬀ Chinese dam developer Private sector
26 Staﬀ European dam developer Private sector
27 Staﬀ International Commission on
Large Dams (ICOLD)
Private sector
28 Staﬀ International Hydropower
Association (IHA)
Private sector
29 Senior engineer European dam developer Private sector
30 Chief executive
oﬃcer (CEO)
Equipment supplier for
hydropower dams
Private sector
31 Social impact
assessment (SIA)
consultant
Major European environmental
and social impact assessment
consultancy
Private sector
32 Project manager
(Latin America)
ESIA consultancy Private sector
33 Consultant (sub-
contracted by
Sinohydro)
ESIA consultancy Private sector
34 Partner Large strategy consultancy Private sector
35 (Former) consultant ESIA consultancy Private sector
36 Consultant ESIA consultancy Private sector
37 Consultant Major consultancy Private sector
38 Consultant Boutique hydropower
consultancy
Private sector
39 Staﬀ Large law ﬁrm Private sector
40 Director Hydropower consultancy Private sector
41 Director Financier Private sector
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dam developers considered are part of a conglomerate that constructs
assets beyond hydropower dams. For instance, CTGC also has an in-
stalled capacity of 3.7 GW of wind and solar power (Li, 2015). For
reasons of scope, we only focus on the parts of such conglomerates that
relate to hydropower dam construction.
The choice to focus on Chinese dam developers reﬂects that the
main source of technology transfer is the private sector, as outlined in
the previous section. However, additional private sector players, most
notably funders such as China Development Bank (CDB) or China Exim
Bank (CEB), could have been chosen as a focus unit of analysis as well.
While their perspective is of relevance to this study, we were largely
unable to access them and thus decided not to focus on them; the em-
pirical grounding of any in-depth discussion of their role would have
been too thin.10
We attempt to generalize ﬁndings regarding Chinese dam devel-
opers’ undertakings throughout this study since we are most interested
in a “more general understanding of generic processes that occur across
cases” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 172). However, we acknowledge
that “one [dam developer] can be very diﬀerent to the other”, as noted
by NGO staﬀ we interviewed, and that our attempt to generalize can
thus induce misinterpretation and superﬁciality. Hence, we also at-
tempt to diﬀerentiate as much as possible between the diﬀerent Chinese
dam developers throughout this study. We note that this latter attempt
is exacerbated by the anonymity ensured to our interviewees.
Data for this study was collected via expert interviews. These were
conducted in 2015, 2016 and 2017. Overall, 41 relevant interviews
have been carried out (Table 2). We were particularly interested in
interviewees with an overview regarding the hydropower industry,
given that this study attempts to provide a helicopter perspective re-
garding Chinese dam developers’ undertakings in Europe and Latin
America. Most interviews were loosely structured. We ensured anon-
ymity since we believe that this approach helped us to build trust and
thus gain additional insights, as also argued by Berry (2002). We
provide selected details regarding interviewees whenever possible. In-
formation which is not referenced in Section 5 is derived from expert
interviews, mirroring Urban et al. (2015c).
In addition to expert interview, document analysis (with documents
considered being peer-reviewed articles, newspapers pieces and re-
levant industry reports) was carried out. We particularly undertook
document analysis to update the list of dam projects with Chinese in-
volvement in Europa and Latin America that has been provided by
International Rivers (2014). For this purpose, we searched websites of
Chinese dam developers regarding dam projects and also consulted the
Environmental Justice Atlas (EJA, 2017). Furthermore, we undertook
Google News Archive searches with a variety of diﬀerent keyword
combinations (e. g. ‘CTGC’ and ‘Brazil’) (we also asked interviewees
regarding dam projects with Chinese involvement in Europe and Latin
America). We identiﬁed a total of eight dam projects that are not listed
in the database by International Rivers (2014) and complemented most
of the entries in this database with up-to-date information. The relevant
lists of dam projects are provided in Tables 4 and 5. These provide the
most comprehensive overviews of dam projects with Chinese involve-
ment in Europe and Latin America that is currently publicly available,
as far as we are aware.
5. Results and discussion
This section starts by summarizing our core ﬁndings regarding
technology transfer in Chinese dam developers’ undertakings in Europe
and Latin America. The two succeeding sub-sections are then structured
as follows. First, we provide accounts of Sinohydro's, CTGC's and ad-
ditional Chinese dam developers’ undertakings in Europe respectively
Latin America. We then discuss drivers and inhibitors of identiﬁed
technology transfer. The core ﬁndings of this section are summarized in
Table 3.
A dimension of technology transfer in Chinese dam developers’
undertakings in Europe was found in nine instances.11 All involve the
transfer of hardware, but only three the transfer of software which re-
ﬂects Urban et al. (2015b) who found evidence for the transfer of
hardware in the case of Cambodia's Kamchay Dam, constructed by Si-
nohydro, but only limited software transfer. We further note, also
Table 3
Summary of core ﬁndings.
Europe Latin America
Key Chinese Players • CNEEP• CTGC• CWE• Norinco International• Sinohydro• State Grid• Yangtze Power
• China Gezhouba• China Harbin Electric International• China Machinery Engineering Corporation• CNEEP• CTGC• CWE• Dongfang Electric Corporation• Hydro China• Sinohydro
Technology Transfer Dimension • Hardware• Software •
Hardware
Channel • Trade• FDI •
Trade
• FDI
Type • SSTT• NSTT •
SSTT
Drivers Business • Costs• Capacities •
Costs
• Lacking access to ﬁnance
Geopolitical • Creation of trading area • Access to (natural) resources
Inhibitors • Dismal reputation regarding safeguards • Dismal reputation regarding safeguards• Protectionist policies• Signiﬁcant capacities of host country players
9 A large dam is deﬁned as any dam above 15 m in height (measured from the lowest
point of foundation to top of dam) or any dam between 10 and 15 m in height which
meets at least one of the following conditions: a) the crest length is not less than 500 m; b)
the capacity of the reservoir formed by the dam is not less than one million cubic meters;
c) the maximum ﬂood discharge dealt with by the dam is not less than 2 000 m3 per
second (ICOLD, 2015).
10 We also brieﬂy considered to include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) as one of our case studies. However, we then found that AIIB does not sponsor
hydropower dam projects, although it plans to do so in the near future (AIIB, 2017).
11 Four of the identiﬁed undertakings are only proposed and thus no dimension of
technology transfer has occurred for them yet. Meanwhile, insuﬃcient information was
gathered for two other undertakings.
J. Kirchherr, N. Matthews Energy Policy 113 (2018) 546–558
550
Ta
bl
e
4
H
yd
ro
po
w
er
in
du
st
ry
un
de
rt
ak
in
gs
w
it
h
C
hi
ne
se
in
vo
lv
em
en
t
in
Eu
ro
pe
.
U
nd
er
ta
ki
ng
C
ou
nt
ry
H
ei
gh
t
(m
)
Si
ze
(M
W
)
C
os
ts
St
at
us
St
ar
t
C
om
pl
et
io
n
Fi
na
nc
ie
r(
s)
D
am
bu
il
de
r(
s)
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
tr
an
sf
er
D
im
en
si
on
C
ha
nn
el
Ty
pe
H
ar
dw
ar
e
So
ft
w
ar
e
Tr
ad
e
FD
I
1
Bu
sh
at
A
lb
an
ia
N
/A
40
15
0
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
01
20
08
C
EB
C
W
E
✓
✓
SS
TT
2
D
ab
ar
Bo
sn
ia
an
d
H
er
ze
go
vi
na
N
/A
16
0
N
/A
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
13
O
ng
oi
ng
N
/A
C
W
E
✓
✓
SS
TT
3
K
an
iv
Pu
m
p
St
or
ag
e
U
kr
ai
ne
74
14
40
14
00
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
C
hi
ne
se
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
ba
nk
Si
no
hy
dr
o,
U
kr
H
yd
ro
En
er
go
✓
SS
TT
4
K
ha
do
ri
G
eo
rg
ia
N
/A
24
33
C
om
pl
et
ed
N
/A
20
06
St
at
e
G
ri
d
St
at
e
G
ri
d
✓
✓
SS
TT
5
K
om
ar
ni
ca
R
iv
er
M
on
te
ne
gr
o
17
6
23
2
22
2
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Si
no
hy
dr
o,
N
or
in
co
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l
✓
SS
TT
6
K
oz
ja
k
M
ac
ed
on
ia
13
0
82
N
/A
C
om
pl
et
ed
19
94
20
02
N
/A
C
W
E
✓
✓
SS
TT
7
N
es
kr
a
G
eo
rg
ia
13
5
28
0
10
00
Su
sp
en
de
d
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
SS
TT
8
N
iz
hn
e
A
ng
ar
sk
ay
a
R
us
si
a
N
/A
11
00
N
/A
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Y
an
gt
ze
Po
w
er
,
Eu
ro
Si
bE
ne
rg
o
✓
✓
SS
TT
9
N
iz
hn
e-
Bu
re
ys
ka
ya
R
us
si
a
47
32
0
40
8
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
10
20
16
N
/A
C
TG
C
,R
us
H
yd
ro
✓
✓
✓
SS
TT
10
Pu
rc
ha
se
of
st
ak
e
in
ED
P
Po
rt
ug
al
N
/A
N
/A
27
00
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
11
20
11
C
TG
C
C
TG
C
✓
✓
✓
N
ST
T
11
Ta
rn
it
a-
La
pu
st
es
ti
Pu
m
p
St
or
ag
e
R
om
an
ia
N
/A
10
00
N
/A
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Bi
ds
fr
om
tw
o
C
hi
ne
se
co
ns
or
ti
aa
✓
SS
TT
12
Tr
an
s-
Si
bi
rs
ka
ya
R
us
si
a
N
/A
65
0
N
/A
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Y
an
gt
ze
Po
w
er
,
Eu
ro
Si
bE
ne
rg
o
✓
SS
TT
13
U
lo
g
Se
rb
ia
53
17
.5
60
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
12
20
16
C
D
B
Si
no
hy
dr
o,
EF
T
G
ro
up
✓
✓
SS
TT
14
V
ar
da
r
V
al
le
yb
M
ac
ed
on
ia
N
/A
N
/A
15
00
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
C
D
B
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
SS
TT
15
V
it
eb
sk
Be
la
ru
s
N
/A
40
23
0
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
11
20
16
C
D
B
C
N
EE
P
✓
✓
✓
SS
TT
a
Fi
rs
t
C
hi
ne
se
co
ns
or
ti
a:
C
hi
na
H
ua
di
an
En
gi
ne
er
in
g
w
it
h
G
ui
zh
ou
W
uj
ia
ng
H
yd
ro
po
w
er
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t,
se
co
nd
C
hi
ne
se
co
ns
or
ti
a:
H
ua
ne
ng
La
ng
ca
ng
R
iv
er
H
yd
ro
po
w
er
w
it
h
H
yd
ro
la
nc
an
g
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l
En
er
gy
.
b
W
ou
ld
co
m
pr
is
e
th
e
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
of
12
H
PP
s.
J. Kirchherr, N. Matthews Energy Policy 113 (2018) 546–558
551
Ta
bl
e
5
H
yd
ro
po
w
er
in
du
st
ry
un
de
rt
ak
in
gs
w
it
h
C
hi
ne
se
in
vo
lv
em
en
t
in
La
ti
n
A
m
er
ic
a.
#
U
nd
er
ta
ki
ng
C
ou
nt
ry
H
ei
gh
t
(m
)
Si
ze
(M
W
)
C
os
ts
St
at
us
St
ar
t
C
om
pl
et
io
n
Fi
na
nc
ie
r(
s)
D
am
bu
il
de
r(
s)
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
tr
an
sf
er
D
im
en
si
on
C
ha
nn
el
Ty
pe
H
ar
dw
ar
e
So
ft
w
ar
e
Tr
ad
e
FD
I
1
A
m
ai
la
Fa
lls
G
uy
an
a
25
16
5
16
4
Su
sp
en
de
d
20
13
N
/A
IA
D
B,
C
D
B,
Lo
w
C
ar
bo
n
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
St
ra
te
gy
Fu
nd
,C
hi
na
R
ai
lw
ay
Fi
rs
t
G
ro
up
,
N
or
w
eg
ia
n
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
N
/A
✓
✓
SS
TT
2
A
qu
a
Za
rc
a
H
on
du
ra
s
N
/A
22
N
/A
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
13
O
ng
oi
ng
D
ES
A
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
✓
SS
TT
3
Ba
ri
na
s
V
en
ez
ue
la
N
/A
10
0
50
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
11
N
/A
Si
no
hy
dr
o
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
✓
SS
TT
4
C
ap
ul
in
Sa
n
Pa
bl
o
C
os
ta
R
ic
a
51
50
N
/A
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
13
20
17
N
/A
H
yd
ro
C
hi
na
SS
TT
5
C
ha
gl
la
Pe
ru
20
2
46
2
12
00
C
om
pl
et
ed
N
/A
N
/A
IA
D
B
C
TG
C
✓
SS
TT
6
C
ha
lil
lo
Be
liz
e
45
7
30
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
03
20
05
C
an
ad
ia
n
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
A
ge
nc
y
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
✓
SS
TT
7
C
hu
ca
s
C
os
ta
R
ic
a
63
50
N
/A
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
11
20
16
N
/A
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
✓
SS
TT
8
C
oc
a
C
od
o
Si
nc
la
ir
Ec
ua
do
r
31
15
00
19
80
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
10
20
16
C
EB
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
✓
SS
TT
9
D
el
si
ta
ni
sa
gu
a
Ec
ua
do
r
35
11
5
23
0
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
13
O
ng
oi
ng
C
D
B
H
id
ro
no
va
,
H
yd
ro
C
hi
na
✓
✓
SS
TT
10
El
R
ev
en
ta
do
r
Ec
ua
do
r
N
/A
52
0
26
90
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
C
EB
C
hi
na
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
En
gi
ne
er
in
g
C
or
po
ra
ti
on
,S
in
oh
yd
ro
SS
TT
11
Ju
pi
á/
Il
ha
So
lt
ei
ra
Br
az
il
53
/7
6
49
50
14
80
C
om
pl
et
ed
N
/A
N
/A
C
TG
C
N
/A
✓
SS
TT
12
M
ag
da
le
na
R
iv
er
C
ol
om
bi
a
30
–1
50
N
/A
N
/A
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
C
D
B
H
yd
ro
C
hi
na
,C
or
m
ag
da
le
na
SS
TT
13
M
az
ar
-D
ud
as
Ec
ua
do
r
N
/A
21
51
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
11
20
17
C
D
B
C
N
EE
P
✓
✓
SS
TT
14
M
ia
ns
Jo
bo
ne
s
Ec
ua
do
r
N
/A
33
5
55
2
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
Ba
nk
of
C
hi
na
,I
A
D
B,
A
nd
ea
n
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
C
or
po
ra
ti
on
,E
cu
ad
or
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
N
/A
SS
TT
15
M
in
as
Sa
n
Fr
an
ci
sc
o
Ec
ua
do
r
78
27
6
47
7
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
14
20
17
C
D
B,
C
EB
C
hi
na
H
ar
bi
n
El
ec
tr
ic
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l,
Si
no
hy
dr
o,
C
ar
dn
o
✓
✓
SS
TT
16
N
és
to
r
K
ir
ch
ne
r/
Jo
rg
e
C
ep
er
ni
c
A
rg
en
ti
na
75
/4
3
17
40
40
00
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
15
O
ng
oi
ng
C
D
B,
Ba
nk
of
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
C
hi
na
G
ez
ho
ub
a,
El
ec
tr
oi
ng
en
ie
ri
a,
H
yd
ro
cu
yo
✓
SS
TT
17
O
ca
na
Ec
ua
do
r
N
/A
26
37
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
08
N
/A
Ba
nk
of
C
hi
na
,I
A
D
B,
A
nd
ea
n
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
C
or
po
ra
ti
on
,E
cu
ad
or
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
A
ls
to
m
H
yd
ro
Es
pa
na
✓
✓
SS
TT
18
Pa
tu
ca
II
H
on
du
ra
s
10
5
27
0
N
/A
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
SS
TT
19
Pa
tu
ca
II
A
H
on
du
ra
s
N
/A
15
0
N
/A
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
SS
TT
20
Pa
tu
ca
II
I
H
on
du
ra
s
55
10
5
35
0
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
11
O
ng
oi
ng
In
du
st
ri
al
an
d
C
om
m
er
ci
al
Ba
nk
of
C
hi
na
Si
no
hy
dr
o,
D
on
gf
an
g
El
ec
tr
ic
C
or
po
ra
ti
on
✓
✓
SS
TT
21
Q
ui
jo
s
Ec
ua
do
r
14
4
50
N
/A
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
N
/A
O
ng
oi
ng
C
D
B,
C
EB
C
N
EE
P
✓
✓
SS
TT
22
R
ev
en
ta
zó
n
C
os
ta
R
ic
a
13
0
30
6
14
00
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
10
20
16
IF
C
,I
A
D
B,
EI
B,
C
os
ta
R
ic
an
G
ov
er
nm
en
t,
C
EB
A
nd
ri
tz
,S
in
oh
yd
ro
✓
✓
SS
TT
23
Sa
n
G
ab
an
II
I
Pe
ru
N
/A
26
0
43
8
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
C
TG
C
/E
D
P
✓
SS
TT
24
Sa
nt
a
M
ar
ia
Pe
ru
13
7
75
0
16
00
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
20
20
N
/A
C
hi
na
G
ez
ho
ub
a,
En
er
gi
a
A
zu
l
✓
SS
TT
25
Sa
nt
o
A
nt
on
io
Br
az
il
14
31
50
N
/A
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
08
20
12
St
at
e
Po
w
er
In
ve
st
m
en
t
C
or
po
ra
ti
on
C
on
so
rt
iu
m
of
Br
az
ili
an
pl
ay
er
s
✓
SS
TT
26
Sa
o
Lu
iz
de
Ta
pa
jo
s
Br
az
il
53
80
40
58
00
Pr
op
os
ed
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
C
TG
C
✓
SS
TT
27
So
pl
ad
or
a
Ec
ua
do
r
N
/A
48
7
75
5
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
11
20
16
C
EB
C
hi
na
G
ez
ho
ub
a
✓
✓
SS
TT
28
To
ac
hi
Pi
la
to
n
Ec
ua
do
r
60
25
3
58
9
U
nd
er
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
20
10
N
/A
R
os
ex
im
ba
nk
,B
an
k
of
th
e
Ec
ua
do
ri
an
In
st
it
ut
e
of
So
ci
al
Se
cu
ri
ty
C
W
E,
In
te
r
R
A
O
U
ES
✓
✓
✓
SS
TT
29
V
ac
a
Be
liz
e
N
/A
18
39
C
om
pl
et
ed
20
07
20
10
N
/A
Si
no
hy
dr
o
✓
✓
SS
TT
J. Kirchherr, N. Matthews Energy Policy 113 (2018) 546–558
552
echoing Urban et al. (2015b), that we did not ﬁnd evidence for the
transfer of know-why skills as a sub-dimension of software in any of the
undertakings. Technology transfer occurred via fourteen dam projects
and one merger. This indicates that trade may indeed be a much more
common channel of technology transfer than FDI, as already outlined
by Schneider et al. (2008). Seven of the 15 undertakings (47%) include
Chinese ﬁnancing. Meanwhile, six of the 14 dam projects (43%) com-
prise a collaboration of a Chinese dam developer with a domestic
player. The technology transfer undertakings identiﬁed are cases of
(mostly) mutual SSTT except for one (a case of NSTT; further discussed
below) which indicates that players in developed countries are appar-
ently largely not considered as a necessity to carry out large HPPs.
Meanwhile, a dimension of technology transfer in Chinese dam
developers’ undertakings in Latin America was found in 17 instances.12
All relate to the transfer of hardware, but no instance of software
transfer, with hardware transfer thus being even more dominant than
software transfer in Latin America than in Europe. Consequently, no
instances of know-why transfer were identiﬁed. Furthermore, 21 in-
stances of dam construction by a Chinese company and thus trade were
identiﬁed as well as three cases of Chinese dam developers purchasing
an existing hydropower asset which is an example of FDI (Schneider
et al., 2008). 17 of the 29 undertakings (59%) include Chinese ﬁnan-
cing, a share more than 10% higher than in Europe. Meanwhile, 8 of the
29 dam projects (28%) comprise a collaboration of a Chinese dam de-
veloper with a domestic player. The type of technology transfer is
(frequently mutual) SSTT for the identiﬁed undertakings, according to
our research.
5.1. Technology transfer in Chinese dam Developers’ undertakings in
Europe
5.1.1. Sinohydro
Sinohydro is involved in more undertakings in Europe (ﬁve) than
any other Chinese dam developer which indicates that it may be the
largest Chinese dam developer, as already argued by Urban et al.
(2015a) and Verhoeven (2015). Only limited evidence was found re-
garding dimensions of technology transfer in these projects. The only
dimension of technology transfer identiﬁed is hardware transfer via
trade that is Chinese-led SSTT. It relates to the construction of the
17.5 MW Ulog HPP in Serbia which is also the only project of Sinohydro
in Europe that is listed on the company's website (Sinohydro, 2017a).
Sinohydro was subcontracted for this project by EFT Group, a European
energy trading and investment group, via an engineering, procurement
and construction (EPC) contract13 with EFT Group now operating the
HPP for 30 years (EFT Group, 2017; Yankson et al., 2017). The set-up of
this project resembles the 400 MW Bui HPP in Ghana, also constructed
by Sinohydro, which is now operated by the Ghanaian Bui Power Au-
thority (BPA) (Hensengerth, 2012; Kirchherr et al., 2016b).
5.1.2. CTGC
CTGC features two undertakings in Europe, according to our re-
search. This is surprising given that CTGC's (2015) annual report, its
last annual report that is available online, states that developing small
and medium HPPs in Europe is a strategic priority for CTGC (CTGC,
2015). Both undertakings, unlike Sinhydro's Ulog HPP (which merely
focused on design of, procurement for and construction of the project),
feature hardware as well as software transfer. The identiﬁed instance of
trade that is mutual SSTT is the 320 MW Nizhne-Bureyskaya HPP in
Russia. The project was constructed in a joint venture with RusHydro, a
Russian dam developer, with both companies now also responsible for
the operation of the HPP (and CTGC carrying out some training re-
garding operation for RusHydro) (PT, 2017b). Meanwhile, CTGC's most
notable activity in Europe in recent years (in 2011) was its purchase of
a 21% stake in EDP, a Portuguese dam developer (Bugge, 2011). Our
interviews suggest that this FDI may be best understood as evidence for
NSTT from the Portuguese player to CTGC.
5.1.3. Additional Chinese dam developers
The Chinese dam developer most active in Europe after Sinohydro is
CWE with three identiﬁed undertakings. These involved the transfer of
hardware. For instance, State Grid, the second largest company in the
world by revenue, has constructed and is now also operating since 2006
the 24 MW Khadori HPP, the ﬁrst foreign-funded power station in
Georgia, an instance of trade that is SSTT (Xinhua, 2017). Evidence for
the transfer of software beyond the CTGC instance was found in the
40 MW Vitebsk HPP in Belarus which is carried out by CNEEC, another
instance of trade that is Chinese-led SSTT, according to our research.
The ﬁrm was not only hired to commission the HPP, but also to provide
maintenance during the warranty period, and train domestic personnel
which is supposed to operate the HPP upon completion of this training
(Belarus.by, 2015).
5.1.4. Drivers
An important driver of technology transfer in the European market
are business considerations. The cost-competitiveness of Chinese bids is
a key driver (Kirchherr et al., 2017) with some bids being 25% cheaper
than the second cheapest (non-Chinese) bidder. Furthermore, Chinese
and European dam developers are both keen to learn from each other.
For instance, CTGC was onboarded in the Nizhne-Bureyskaya project
since the Russian dam developer was keen to gain both hardware and
software via CTGC's involvement. Meanwhile, CTGC was and is keen to
enter the European and Latin American market, but potential customers
believed it would lack the needed ability to implement internationally
recognized safeguards. These safeguards constitute a hardware which
CTGC hoped to acquire via the purchase of the EDP stake – the only
identiﬁed instance of NSTT in our study. This indicates that safeguards
may be the only remaining hardware part of HPP technology where
players from the North still have an edge over Southern players. “China
Three Gorges Corporation tried to enter [the European and Latin
American] market for decades. They just couldn't do it alone”, a con-
sultant who advised EDP told us.
Interviewees also noted that Chinese players need local engineers
for dam construction despite their vast experiences with dam con-
struction gained in China (McDonald et al., 2009). One consultant ex-
plained that the Chinese “don’t know our rocks here, our soil, the to-
pography. You need local knowledge for this which only our engineers
have”. Chinese developers interviewed acknowledged this and also
outlined that they would be keen to learn from their European partners
in projects beyond contextual aspects of dam construction. “We […]
need more exchange […] in terms of what is the newest technology
available and what could be the most sustainable technology”, a Chi-
nese dam developer said.
The described business drivers must also be seen in the context of
geopolitical drivers. These are formalized for Europe via the One Belt
One Road Initiative (OBOR), a Chinese-led strategy. Its aim is to in-
crease cooperation between Eurasian countries with the intention of
creating a trading area that can rival the transatlantic one which is
dominated by the United States (Du, 2016; Lee and Lye, 2016). This
initiative covers more than half of the world's population, 75% of its
energy resources and 40% of its GDP (Shepard, 2016). For instance,
China's political leadership has pledged to invest in Georgia's hydro-
power sector as part of OBOR (Xinhua, 2016). Similarly, the Vitebsk
12 Eight of the identiﬁed undertakings are only proposed and thus no dimension of
technology transfer has occurred for them yet. Meanwhile, insuﬃcient information was
gathered for four undertakings.
13 Under an EPC contract (also called ‘turnkey contract’), the contractor has the duty to
design, procure and construct the entire project. This arrangement thus places the re-
sponsibility for the entire project in the hands of the contractor. A ﬁxed pricing method is
usually used for these types of contracts. The EPC contractor does not operate the project
once completed (unlike the BOT contractor) (Chen and Landry, 2016; International
Rivers, 2012).
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HPP in Belarus has been explicitly framed by the Chinese political
leadership as a project that needs to be seen as part of this initiative
(Belarus News, 2016). We note that none of the undertakings we ex-
amined in Europe seem to be driven by Chinese attempts to securing
access to natural resources. Belarus is even known as a country with
very limited natural resources (Rapoza, 2017).
5.1.5. Inhibitors
Chinese players’ reputation regarding the non-adherence to safe-
guards acts as the main inhibitor regarding Chinese-led undertakings in
Europe, according to our research. This connects to McNally et al.
(2009) as well as a recent study by Kirchherr et al. (2017) that outlined
that 57% of those involved in the hydropower industry in Myanmar,
Laos and Cambodia ﬁnd Chinese dam developers’ performance re-
garding social safeguards to be poor. A case in point for reputation is-
sues in Europe is Sinohydro. Overall, our research indicates that Sino-
hydro has had diﬃculties in entering the European market. For
instance, we found that the dam developer aimed to provide, via trade,
Chinese-led SSTT in countries such as Georgia and Montenegro. How-
ever, its contract for the construction of the 280 MW Neskra HPP in
Georgia was terminated (despite the outlined Chinese pledge on de-
veloping Georgia's hydropower industry) with the HPP now taken over
by a consortium that includes the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD). Meanwhile Sinohydro initially expressed
interest in developing Montenegro's Komarnica River, but eventually
did not submit a bid, allegedly because it deemed the site to have too
grave geological problems. Interviewees suggested, though, that it was
indicated to Sinohydro that it would be unable to win the respective bid
due to its reputation not to uphold international safeguards. CTGC's
inability to carry out more dam projects in the European market despite
its explicit positioning towards Europe also indicates that its reputation
regarding safeguards acts as an inhibitor of technology transfer.
Overall, the limited involvement of Chinese dam developers in Europe
suggests that the identiﬁed problematic reputation regarding safe-
guards as an inhibitor outweighs the outlined drivers at this moment.
More NSTT regarding safeguards may be needed to change this.
5.2. Technology transfer in Chinese dam developers’ undertakings in Latin
America
5.2.1. Sinohydro
Sinohydro is involved in more undertakings (twelve) than any other
Chinese dam developer, according to our research. Thus, it is likely the
most dominant Chinese dam developer in the Latin American market.
Evidence for Sinohydro-led hardware transfer was found in nine of
these instances with Sinohydro usually acting as an EPC contractor in
these projects. One example of a recently completed EPC project is the
1500 MW Coca Codo Sinclair HPP in Ecuador, the largest energy pro-
ject in the country's history which now supplies 44% of Ecuador's
electricity needs (PT, 2017c). This project is now operated by Empresa
Pública Estratégica Hidroeléctrica, an Ecuadorian player (Sinohydro,
2017b)
5.2.2. CTGC
CTGC features three undertakings in Latin America, according to
our research. This number is surprisingly small, given CTGC's purchase
of a part of EDP to signiﬁcantly expand in the Latin American market,
as discussed earlier. The only undertaking of an instance of trade
identiﬁed that resulted from this purchase is the 260 MW San Gaban III
in Peru which was won by Hydro Global Peru which, in turn, is com-
posed of CTGC and EDP (Ingram, 2016). Meanwhile, CTGC acquired
the operational HPPs in Brazil, the Jupiá and Ilha Solteira HPPs with a
joint capacity of 4950 MW (Li, 2015), while it also just acquired the
operational 462 MW Chaglla HPP (Weinman, 2017), two instances of
FDI. We believe these investments can be seen as eﬀorts to gain a
foothold in the Latin American market.
5.2.3. Additional Chinese dam developers
The only Chinese dam developer that is comparably active to
Sinohydro and CTGC in Latin America is China Gezhouba with three
undertakings. These all involve hardware transfer via trade. The dif-
ferent HPPs are usually carried out in a collaboration of a Chinese dam
developer and additional non-Chinese players. For instance, the
750 MW Santa Maria HPP in Peru is carried out by China Gezhouba and
Energia Azul, a Peruvian utility (HydroWorld.com, 2012). Meanwhile,
the Argentinian 1740 MW Néstor-Kirchner-Jorge Cepernic HPP is built
by a consortium that entails China Gezhouba as well as the Argentinian
players Electroingenieria and Hydrocuyo (Xinhua, 2015). We found
that hardware transfer in Latin America does not only entail EPC con-
tracts, but only the provision of selected items, e. g. turbines. For in-
stance, Dongfang Electric Corporation only provides turbines for the
construction of the 105 MW Patuca III HPP in Honduras (Lagos, 2017).
The only instance of FDI beyond those by CTGC is the attempt by State
Power Investment Corporation to purchase the Brazilian 3150 MW
Santo Antonio HPP (Petroleumworld, 2017), identiﬁed as an attempt to
gain a presence in this market.
5.2.4. Drivers
Business considerations are an important driver in the Latin
American market. First, technology transfer from Chinese to Latin
American players is enabled by the cost-eﬃcient provision of this
technology by the Chinese, e. g. the case of the purchase of turbines for
the 105 MW Patuca III HPP in Honduras. One consultant claimed that
“the Chinese are 30% cheaper than domestic players on average”. The
winning oﬀer for Argentinia's Néstor Kirchner-Jorge Cepernic HPP, led
by a consortium around CTGC, was 17% cheaper than the second-
placed oﬀer (Xinhua, 2015).
Another key driver is the lack of access to hydropower ﬁnancing.
This explains the higher share of Chinese ﬁnancing in Latin America
when compared to Europe (59% versus 47%). This also particularly
explains why Ecuador features the most undertakings with Chinese
involvement. With Ecuador cut oﬀ from Western investments in late
2008 when the country declared its national debt to be illegitimate,
Ecuador had very limited ﬁnancing options. Most of the USD 10 billion
of loans provided to Ecuador since 2009 by China have been dedicated
to hydropower development (EIU, 2016). This contrasts signiﬁcantly
with China's investment in the country in 2007 which amounted to just
USD 7 million (Briones Hidrovo et al., 2017; EIU, 2016). Interviewees
pointed out that projects such as the 1500 MW Coca Codo Sinclair HPP
in Ecuador would not have been possible without Chinese ﬁnancing. As
one interviewee said: “This project was something the [Ecuadorian]
government had wanted to build for a long time, but it was unable to
raise the capital to do so.”
Chinese ﬁnancing is even attractive for Latin American countries
with access to Western investments since this ﬁnancing usually comes
with none of the policy requirements imposed by Western lenders
(Grugel et al., 2008; Matthews and Motta, 2015). It would be erroneous
to state, though, that Chinese ﬁnancing is entirely unconditional. The
conditionality is more business-oriented. For instance, the USD 300
million loan provided by CEB for the construction of the Reventazón
HPP was tied to allowing Sinohydro to participate in the project (CAD,
2011).
Geopolitical considerations also drive Chinese engagement and thus
technology transfer in Latin American undertakings. Access to (natural)
resources is the geopolitical driver that was identiﬁed in Latin America.
A case in point is CTGC's involvement in the 8040 MW Sao Luiz de
Patajos HPP. This dam would not just provide electricity, but also re-
duce the cost of food exports from Brazil to China via the Tapajós-Teles
Pires waterway by linking remote industrial farms in Mato Grosso state
with the Amazon River and the seaport of Belem (Blocksom and
Locatelli, 2016). Meanwhile, China's main geopolitical beneﬁt of as-
sisting Ecuador is access to oil, including oil pre-sales to PetroChina, a
Chinese state-owned oil and gas company, with the Ecuadorian
J. Kirchherr, N. Matthews Energy Policy 113 (2018) 546–558
554
government receiving payments in advance in exchange for guaranteed
future oil shipments (Alvaro, 2011; EIU, 2016). This resonates with
Odoom (2015) who also found that the attempt to access oil has driven
Chinese dam developers’ engagement in Africa. Meanwhile, Mohan and
Power, p. 30 ﬀ.) (2008) write that securing energy resources has been a
core driver of much Chinese engagement overseas since the 1990s.
Indeed, “individual projects do not necessarily need to be proﬁtable to
be approved [as long as they] contribute to grander […] goals [re-
garding] political and economic strategies” (Matthews and Motta,
2015, p. 6275).
5.2.5. Inhibitors
Three main inhibitors were identiﬁed via our research on Latin
America. The ﬁrst inhibitor was particularly mentioned by NGOs. It
relates to the reputation of Chinese dam developers regarding safe-
guards and thus mirrors the situation in Europe. Particularly wealthier
countries in Latin America such as Brazil and Chile have strict en-
vironmental and social safeguards regulations and Chinese dam de-
velopers are not believed to be able and/or willing to adhere to them.
Indeed, there are numerous examples of Chinese dam developers vio-
lating environmental and social safeguards in Latin American HPPs.
One case in point is Sinohydro's involvement in the 22 MW Aqua Zarca
HPP in Honduras. The ﬁrm had to terminate this engagement in 2013
due to local protests that were grounded in the allegedly insuﬃcient
mitigation of the HPP's negative social impacts by Sinohydro (Banal-
Estañol et al., 2017; Brautigam, 2016; Ellis, 2014). Chinese dam de-
velopers’ reputation may be slowly improving, though. An example are
the HPPs to be constructed on the Magdalena River in Colombia. While
Sinohydro was originally disqualiﬁed from even bidding for these HPP
contracts, the Colombian government is now seemingly keen to engage
Sinohydro, after the Brazilian player Odebrecht was forced to quit the
project due to corruption charges (Acosta, 2017).
Strict safeguards can also be used as tools to implement pro-
tectionism. As one interviewee working for an international NGO
stated: “China has repeatedly tried to be more involved in Brazilian
hydropower, but the government is quite protectionist and has not al-
lowed much participation from Chinese ﬁrms.” Indeed, policies in nu-
merous Latin American countries are designed to favour local ﬁrms
which impedes Chinese engagement and thus technology transfer in
this market. A country with allegedly particularly protectionist policies
is Venezuela, according to our research, which may explain why only a
single Chinese undertaking was identiﬁed here (the country has only
exploited one-third of its economically viable hydropower potential so
far (World Energy Council, 2016b)).
The third inhibitor relates to the signiﬁcant expertise regarding dam
construction in Latin America which was already outlined in Section 2.
As one industry interviewee stated: “Latin American capacity is very
high. The region has world-class engineers”. The Latin American ex-
pertise in dam construction thus explains why no instances of software
transfer were identiﬁed on this continent; Latin American players can
operate even large facilities without external training and the relevant
know-why is also present. Signiﬁcant capacities also explain why there
is less collaboration between Chinese dam developers and domestic
players in Latin American projects than in European ones (28% versus
43%) since these collaborations can be seen facilitating Chinese-led
software transfer. Overall, the limited involvement of Chinese dam
developers in Latin America currently suggests that the identiﬁed in-
hibitors outweigh, like in Europe, the outlined drivers.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
Many in the hydropower industry indicated in the past three years
that there is much interest in this analysis. While a common perception
within the industry is that Chinese players are increasingly active both
in Europe and Latin America, two regions declining in power, no in-
ternational donor, NGO or private sector player that we talked to
maintains a systematic and up-to-date overview regarding Chinese
undertakings in the hydropower industry in Europe and Latin America.
Similarly, scholars have not studied Chinese dam developers’ under-
takings in Europe and Latin America from an industry perspective. The
aim of this study was to start closing this research gap. We did this by
examining the extent, drivers and inhibitors of technology transfer in
Chinese dam developers’ undertakings in Europe and Latin America.
Our work ﬁnds relatively few undertakings of Chinese dam devel-
opers and thus limited evidence for technology transfer both in Europe
and Latin America. The undertakings identiﬁed are usually cases of
mutual South-South technology transfer with Chinese players trans-
ferring technology to the host country and vice versa. Technology
transfer includes the transfer of hardware and software in Europe, but
only the transfer of hardware in Latin America. The most common
channel of technology transfer both in Europe and Latin America is
trade, whereas a few instances of FDI were also identiﬁed. The only
instance of North-South technology transfer found in our study was
CTGC's purchase of a stake in EDP with the safeguards technology
gained via this purchase aimed to help CTGC to enter the Latin
American market – an aim that has not yet materialized. The lack of
NSTT indicates that players in developed countries are apparently lar-
gely not considered as necessary to carry out large HPPs (with the ex-
ception of safeguards).
Technology transfer in Europe and Latin America is driven by both
business and geopolitical considerations. The cost-eﬃcient provision of
technology by Chinese players is an important driver of technology
transfer both in Europe and Latin America with Chinese players oﬀering
services up to 30% cheaper than competitors. Furthermore, limited
hydropower capacities in selected European countries such as Belarus
drive Chinese-led technology transfer on this continent. Meanwhile,
lacking access to hydropower ﬁnancing that is non-Chinese is a major
driver of technology transfer in Latin America. Technology transfer
both in Europe and in Latin America is impeded by Chinese dam de-
velopers’ dismal reputation regarding safeguards. Protectionist policies
as well as the excellent capacities of Latin American players further
inhibit technology transfer in the Latin American market. Overall, the
identiﬁed inhibitors outweigh the identiﬁed drivers and thus explain
why there are only relatively few undertakings in both Europe and
Latin America.
The ﬁnding of our study that bears the greatest policy relevance
may be that
Chinese players frequently collaborate with domestic ones (Europe:
43% of undertakings; Latin America: 28% of undertakings). This in-
dicates that technology transfer to Chinese players is feasible and thus
reach-outs to these players may be worthwhile. For instance, NGOs as
well as donors may carry out trainings for Chinese players regarding
best practice safeguards policies which could then impact the safe-
guards implemented in HPPs with Chinese involvement. Such eﬀorts
could potentially enhance the sustainability of the hydropower sector.
This is desirable for those promoting hydropower as part of the energy
mix of low carbon development as well as for those who believe that
there must be more environmentally-responsible and socially-just al-
ternatives to hydropower at least in the medium-term.
Major data collection eﬀorts were undertaken for three years to
conduct this study. However, players in the dam industry proved to be
extremely secretive, and thus many of our eﬀorts turned out to be futile.
For instance, numerous reach-outs to relevant Chinese funders yielded
no replies, as outlined in Section 4. Hence, we neither claim that the
interview data presented in this study is representative nor that the data
gathered via desk research is exhaustive and/or contains no errors. We
only present an initial narrative regarding Chinese dam developers’
undertakings in Europe and Latin America that is tentative. We decided
to seek the publication of this narrative since we believe that it can
serve as a starting point for future research and thus contributes the
cumulative knowledge development on this topic.
Future research may attempt to replicate our work. It may also focus
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on Chinese engagement in speciﬁc countries and/or speciﬁc under-
takings in Europe and Latin America to validate and further nuance our
ﬁndings. Particularly smaller dam projects tend to be neglected by
scholars. An analysis of the engagement of non-Chinese dam devel-
opers’ undertakings, e. g. European ones (including a comparison of
these undertakings to Chinese dam developers), would also be of great
interest. This work could also examine if there is a presence of non-
Chinese hydropower players in China. Overall, much scholarly work
remains to be done regarding the hydropower industry. We hope that
this study proves to be instructive for this work.
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